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Introduction and Background
A 1988 study conducted by the National Association of Realtors found that a large
majority of home buyers and sellers employed the services of an agent in the transaction
(NAR, 1988). Wolf and Jennings (1991) report that 50% of all lawsuits instituted against
real estate agents involve some aspect of agency disclosure. These statistics imply that
there may be problems associated with the agency relationship in real estate transactions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of alternative forms of agency in
residential real estate transactions. Simple bargaining theory provides a framework in
which to look at participant payoffs under different agency structures and with differing
levels of information among the parties to the bargain. This study focuses on whether the
form of agency affects the equilibrium bargaining outcomes and, if so, who bears the
beneﬁts or costs.
It is well known in the real estate industry that home buyers often mistakenly believe
that the cooperating broker is their representative in the process of price negotiation.1
Nevertheless, the law in most states holds that the cooperating broker in a fee-splitting
commission arrangement is the subagent of the listing broker.2 This implies that the
cooperating broker has a ﬁduciary obligation to the seller in the real estate transaction
and does not owe a duty to the buyer.
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Abstract.  Although substantial research effort has been directed to the examination of
optimal search and pricing behavior under traditional brokerage arrangements, market
outcomes under conditions of undisclosed subagency and buyer representation have not
been fully explored. This study applies the legal and economic theory of agency to real
estate markets with cooperating brokers. The existence of cooperating brokers acting as
subagents of the seller with the buyer’s full knowledge does not change the buyer’s and
seller’s net payoffs relative to the single-agent case. However, when the buyer mistakenly
believes that the cooperating broker/subagent is acting as his agent in negotiations, there
may be informational gains that result in a higher selling price and a higher payoff to the
seller at the expense of the buyer. The analysis indicates that buyer brokers may be a
potential solution to this agency problem. When both parties to a real estate transaction
have separate representation, their net payoffs are shown to be higher and the sales price
lower than under traditional brokerage arrangements. The result is dependent on several
factors, including: market conditions, relative bargaining power of the parties, method of
broker compensation, and disclosure of the status of the buyer broker.A dual agency relationship, in which the broker is held to be the agent of both the buyer
and the seller, arises under very limited conditions (Bryant and Epley, 1992) and requires
full disclosure of the relationship to both parties. The National Association of Realtors
speciﬁcally discourages dual agency because it puts the broker in a difﬁcult role in the
negotiation process. Unless the buyer and seller have exactly the same reservation price,
it is impossible to simultaneously obtain the highest possible price for the seller and the
lowest price for the buyer. Thus, dual agency creates a conﬂict of interest that necessitates
that the agent violate a duty to one or both of the two “principals”. Full disclosure of the
dual agency relationship does not eliminate this conﬂict.
In some states, brokers can also be hired for an additional fee to act exclusively on
behalf of the buyer. This type of agent is often called a “buyer broker”.3 However, the
law is not clear regarding the implications of this form of brokerage, particularly with
respect to the commission to be paid when the transaction is listed on the MLS.
Furthermore, a contingent fee arrangement with the buyer creates an inherent conﬂict
of interest since the best price for the buyer implies a lower fee for the broker. Alter-
native pay arrangements, such as ﬂat fees for completion of the transaction, reduce
conﬂicts of interest but have uncertain impact on multiple listing service (MLS) fee
splitting contracts.
Intuitively, misunderstanding of the brokers’ obligations to each party is likely to result
in revelation of information that harms the negotiation position of one or more parties.
If the brokers strictly adhere to their legal obligations, the likely outcome is that sellers
will be better informed than buyers since the contract price that maximizes the agent’s
welfare under a percentage commission payment structure is also the contract that
maximizes the seller’s welfare, i.e., the highest price. With positive search costs born by
brokers, however, there may be incentives to reveal privileged information obtained from
either party to the transaction in an effort to close a sale.4
These types of informational problems have existed for some time. In the last two
decades, however, the widespread use of multiple listing services has made it more likely
that sales will involve more than one broker.5 Some state legislatures have reacted by
enacting buyer protection laws requiring disclosure of agency relationships6 but it is not
clear that mere disclosure will change the nature of the bargaining outcome.
Although substantial research effort has been directed to the examination of optimal
search and pricing behavior under traditional brokerage arrangements,7 market
outcomes with multiple brokers have not been fully explored in the literature. This study
applies the legal and economic theory of agency to real estate markets with cooperating
brokers and uses a basic bargaining model to analyze the impact of subagency, dual
agency, and separate buyer representation. This study differs from search models such as
Yavas ¸ and Colwell (1994) and Salant (1991) in that the bargaining game is assumed to
begin with the identiﬁcation of a possible match between buyer and seller. Therefore, the
initial search component of the game is not considered, and broker effort is not included
as a component of the payoffs. These are potential extensions for future research.
In the following section, the basic bargaining model is presented and the outcome for
a no-broker case is developed with a numerical example. This example is then extended
to alternative agency arrangements. After a comparison of the bargaining outcomes with
two brokers, under conditions of fully disclosed subagency, undisclosed subagency, and
separate buyer representation in the third section of this study, section four provides
conclusions and policy implications.
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The problem is examined as a simple sequential bargaining game with asymmetric
information. A risk-neutral8 seller and a risk-neutral buyer have been identiﬁed as a
potential match and they bargain to arrive at the ﬁnal sales price. There is exactly one
buyer who has determined that the seller’s house meets his9 desired characteristics (e.g.,
location, size, general price range). The seller has a reservation price10 for the property of
Ps, the lowest price that she is willing to accept for the property, although the initial
asking price will generally be higher. The reservation price for the buyer, the highest price
that he is willing to pay, is PB. It is assumed that taste preferences, personal circum-
stances, and the imperfections in the market for residential real estate are such that the
buyer and seller may place different values on the property. It is assumed that although
the buyer and seller may have expectations with regard to the reservation price of the
other party, each knows only their own with certainty.
The Bargaining Outcome without a Broker (Case 0)
The outcome in the no-broker case is well known. The seller and buyer will engage in a
Nash sequential game in which each takes turn bidding and information is gradually
revealed that allows the seller and buyer to split the surplus (PB–Ps) in proportions v and
(1–v), respectively (see Rubenstein, 1982). The equilibrium price will be:
P05Ps1v(PB–Ps) PB–Psá0 . (1)
Where neither party has a superior bargaining position, v will be equal to .5. If
information is revealed through the process of bargaining that indicates PB¢Ps, then the
game ends and a sale will not take place. The example developed below and elaborated
on in later examples begins with a simple numerical illustration of the case presented in
equation (1).
Numerical Example (Base Case)—No Broker
Suppose that Mr. Buyer has identiﬁed Ms. Seller’s house as meeting his
requirements. Based on available information, Ms. Seller has decided that she
must receive at least $95,000 (Ps) for her house and Mr. Buyer has determined
that he is not willing to pay more than $105,000 (PB). It is assumed that each
party has equal bargaining power (v5.5). The solution to the bargaining game
presented above implies that Mr. Buyer and Ms. Seller will sequentially offer
and counter-offer until they arrive at the price that splits the surplus (i.e., the
difference between their reservation prices), in this case P05$100,000. Mr.
Buyer purchases the house for a price that is $5,000 less than his maximum and
Ms. Seller sells for a price that is $5,000 more than her minimum, although in
each case, the true surplus is this amount less any costs incurred in search and
negotiation of the sale.
In the cases that follow, the ways in which this outcome will differ with alternative forms
of agency are explored. In all cases, the beneﬁts to the parties are calculated without
subtracting for the costs of search and negotiation.
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Assume now that the seller employs a risk-neutral real estate broker to act as her agent in
the sale under an exclusive right-to-sell contract. Since the standard terms of this type of
agreement require that the seller pay the commission even if she ﬁnds the buyer herself, it
is assumed that the seller has no incentive to exert effort and relies totally on the agent to
ﬁnd a buyer and negotiate the sale.11 The broker’s commission upon sale at price P1 is
kP1, where k is the commission rate agreed to by the seller. It is initially assumed that
neither the buyer nor the seller reveal information about their reservation prices to the
agent and thus the agent merely relays the bids between the parties.
Consistent with the results reported below, Yavas ¸ (1992) ﬁnds that equilibrium prices in
the one-agent case will be higher than in the no-broker case12 (P1$P0), but not high
enough to completely offset the commission fee (although both the seller and the buyer
enjoy the beneﬁt of the search and transaction services of the broker). The Nash
bargaining solution is still the price that splits the difference between the reservation
prices, but the seller’s new reservation price is now Ps1kP1, i.e., it is adjusted upward to
reﬂect the additional cost of the expected commission. The sale price that splits the
difference is:
P15Ps1kP11v[PB–(Ps1kP1)] . (2)
Comparing this result to (1), it is evident that the equilibrium price with a broker is
higher. Rearranging (2), we have: P15Ps1v(PB–Ps)1kP1(1–v). Substituting for P0, we
have:
P15P01kP1(1–v) (3)
5P0 / [1–k(1–v)] .
In other words, the price with only a seller’s broker will be higher by a proportion of the
commission. If the parties have equal bargaining power, they will split the commission.13
Numerical Example—Disclosed Subagency
Assume the same facts as the base case, but now there is a broker who has
contracted with the Ms. Seller to be paid 6%14 of the sales price P1 upon sale. In
order to net at least her minimum of $95,000, Ms. Seller now must receive that
amount plus 6% of P1. Splitting the difference using equation (3) results in sales
price P15$103,092.78 which nets Ms. Seller $96,907.21. Both Seller and Buyer
bear costs as compared to the no-broker case in the amount of 50% of the
commission ($3092.79 each), but they also get the beneﬁt of reduced search and
transaction facilitation. Ms. Seller receives $1907.22 more than her minimum
net payoff and Mr. Buyer pays $1907.22 less than his required maximum out-of-
pocket cost.
The Two-Broker Case with Fully Disclosed Subagency (Case 2)
Assume now that the brokerage arrangement involves a split commission between a
listing broker and cooperating broker, so that the listing broker’s commission upon sale
will be akP2 where a is the listing broker’s share of the commission percentage k based
upon the negotiated sales price P2. The cooperating broker’s commission is thus (1–a)kP2.
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cooperating broker is actually a subagent of the listing broker and thus owes a duty to the
seller and is only a transaction facilitator for the buyer. If the buyer understands this,
then the outcome should be exactly the same as in the one-broker case offered above,
assuming that the buyer does not provide information to the broker sufﬁcient to indicate
his reservation price.15 This implies that:
P25P15P0 / [1–k(1–v)] . (4)
Yavas ¸ (1992) notes that in cooperative sales, the listing broker may exert less effort in
the initial matching of buyer and seller, but the lower effort will be at least partially offset
by the effort of the cooperating broker. It should be noted, however, that the initial
assumption is that the broker will adhere to the agency obligations imposed by law and
act in the best interest of the seller. In a later section, the impact of incentive incom-
patibility between the broker and the buyer is considered.
The Two-Broker Case with Undisclosed Agent (Case 3)
Consider now the case in which the game is played without informing the buyer that the
agent is actually working on behalf of the seller. Believing that the cooperating broker is
acting in their best interest, the seller and the buyer provide information to their brokers
with regard to Ps and PB, perhaps even revealing the exact reservation price. Other
valuable information that might be revealed is the degree to which the buyer is committed
to buying the particular property (which is a function of the availability of other
properties that meet the requirements of the buyer). As before, we assume that the buyer’s
reservation price PB includes consideration of these factors.
The law of agency implies that the cooperating broker should reveal any relevant
information to the listing broker. In the sequential bargaining game, the solution will no
longer split the surplus. Removal of the uncertainty with regard to PB causes the seller’s
optimal strategy to be a single “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to sell at price PB. Given the
psychology of real estate contracting, the broker would probably recommend that the
seller respond to the buyer’s offers by gradually reducing the ask price until it equals PB
and refuse to negotiate further. The transaction price of P35PB is a net gain to the seller
in the amount of the buyer’s share (1–v) of the surplus.
Numerical Example—Undisclosed Agency
Under the same facts as the other examples, the cooperating broker reveals to
the listing agent that Mr. Buyer is actually willing and able to pay $105,000 
for the property. Knowing this, the listing agent instructs Ms. Seller to not
counter-offer below this amount and the parties will eventually contract at
P35$105,000. Ms. Seller now nets .94 ($105,000)5$98,700 ($3,700 better than
her minimum required net) and Mr. Buyer, the victim of undisclosed agency, is
worse off than in any of the other brokered scenarios considered thus far.
The Bargaining Outcome with a “Buyer Broker” (Case 4)
Consider now the situation in which the seller has retained the services of a broker (under
the same terms as in the previous example), but the buyer, knowing of inherent conﬂicts
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outcome in this circumstance will differ depending upon the method of broker compen-
sation. There are many possible compensation methods, but the following will be
considered below:
· The broker splits the full k% commission with the listing broker as would a
cooperating broker.16
· The broker is paid directly by the buyer at c% of the sales price.17
· The broker is paid a ﬂat-rate payment directly by the buyer upon sale.18
The ﬁrst alternative should result in at least as low a sales price outcome as the single-
broker case and the two-broker case with full disclosure. However, if it is the case that the
buyer receives better advice, greater effort, or other beneﬁts due to his separate repre-
sentation in the transaction, the net beneﬁt to him after costs may be higher than they are
without the buyer broker.
The second alternative payment scheme for buyer brokers may at ﬁrst seem to be no
different than the ﬁrst. However, there is no reason to believe that the buyer broker’s
commission c should be the same as the (1–a) share of the k% MLS commission. Even if
c5(1–a), the outcome will differ from the earlier cases because of the different impact on
reservation prices. If the buyer broker receives c% commission and the listing broker
receives a% of the k% commission, the buyer’s new reservation price is PB–cP4 so that
after paying the commission, the net cost to the buyer is no more than PB. The seller’s
new minimum acceptable price is Ps1akP4.19 The transaction price that splits the surplus
will be:
P45P0 / [1–ak(1–v)1vc] . (5)
Equation (5) implies that the buyer and seller will split the total commission charges, even
when the buyer broker’s rate is more than the MLS split. When c$ak, the resulting sales
price will be lower than in the single-broker case and no-broker case. If c5ak, the sales
price will be equal to that of the no-broker case (P45P0), although the net beneﬁt to
buyer and seller will be less before accounting for differences in costs (which will
obviously be much higher without a broker).
Numerical Example—Buyer Broker Paid Separate Contingent Commission
Suppose that Mr. Buyer has contracted with a buyer broker to be his exclusive
agent in the transaction for a fee of 3% of the transaction price. Ms. Seller has
contracted at 6% to be split between the listing agent and the selling agent.
Under the facts previously considered, Ms. Seller has a reservation price 
of $95,000 plus 3% of the ﬁnal selling price and Mr. Buyer has a reservation
price of $105,000 minus 3% of the ﬁnal selling price. Splitting the difference
results in a selling price equal to $100,000 and a net beneﬁt to each party of
$2,000 better than their reservation price. (Note that, as compared to the base
case, the value of brokerage services would have to be at least $3,000 to 
each party or there would be no incentive to enter into the brokerage
agreement.)
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MLS split commission (c$ak), the seller will share the additional commission cost and
the resulting sales price, and the net beneﬁt to the parties will be lower than in the case
where the buyer broker’s commission is equivalent to a cooperating broker’s.
The third possibility for payment of buyer brokers is a ﬂat-rate contract. The agency
literature and intuition clearly indicate that a ﬂat-rate payment scheme is also undesirable
since it will likely result in lower effort by the agent (Levmore, 1993). When a contract at
any price would give the agent the same payoff, the agent will have no incentive to obtain
the best price for the buyer.20
In order to better compare the outcomes under each of the agency alternatives
considered in this section, Exhibit 1 provides a summary of the outcomes under each
scenario. To make the examples more comparable, the buyer broker case used in the
exhibit assumes that the commission rate c% charged by the buyer broker is equal to the
commission that a cooperating broker would have received (ak%) so that the total
commission for all examples is 6%.
If brokerage services provided to the buyer and seller are valued, then the true beneﬁt
to the buyer or the seller for Cases 1–4 is actually the amount indicated in Exhibit 1 plus
the value of the services rendered by their respective broker. If the value of the services
provided are the same across all of the agency alternatives, we can conclude that the
buyer broker arrangement results in the greatest welfare to the principals. The higher
sales prices in the single-agent and two-agent cases result in higher commissions to the
agents ($6,185.57 compared to $6,000 for the buyer broker case) and commensurately
lower total beneﬁt to the principals ($2,000 compared to $1,907.22 each).
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Exhibit 1
Summary of Numerical Examples
All examples are the result of a simple sequential bargaining game. The initial assumptions 
are that the minimum acceptable net to the seller is $95,000 and the maximum acceptable 
out-of-pocket to the buyer is $105,000. The seller broker charges an MLS split commission 
of 6% of the negotiated sales price and the buyer broker charges a commission of 3%.
Sale Net Beneﬁt Net Beneﬁt
Case Description  Price to Sellera to Buyerb
0 No Broker P05$100,000.00 $5,000.00 $5,000.00
(minus costs)c (minus costs)
1 One Agent P15$103,092.78 $1,907.22 $1,907.22
2 Two Agents- P25$103,092.78 $1,907.22 $1,907.22
Disclosed Agency
3 Two Agents- P35$105,000.00 $3,700.00 0
Undisclosed Agency
4 Buyer Broker- P45$100,000.00 $2,000.00 $2,000.00
Disclosed to Seller
aThe net beneﬁt to the seller is deﬁned as the degree to which the net proceeds exceed the seller’s
required minimum.
bThe net beneﬁt to the buyer is deﬁned as the degree to which the net cost to the buyer is less
than his predetermined maximum.
cWithout a broker, the buyer and seller will incur additional costs of search, negotiation and
transaction which should be netted out for direct comparisons with the brokered scenarios.The Bargaining Outcome with Agency Costs Considered
The alternatives considered above have assumed that the agent(s) will act in the best
interest of the principal(s). There are some inherent incentive compatibility problems21 in
the traditional compensation methods for real estate agents. First, the fact that the
commission is contingent on the ﬁnal sale price (rather than some measure of the degree
to which the brokers’ actions beneﬁt the principal) makes the incentives of the agent and
the incentives of the principal incompatible. This effect is most serious in the case of a
buyer-broker who is typically paid as a percentage of transaction price. The buyer wants
the lowest price but the broker will be paid more if the negotiated price is higher.
However, there are also incentive compatibility problems with seller’s brokers. Although
Geltner et al. (1991) show that incentive conﬂicts may intensify as the listing contract
nears an end, a recent study by Miceli (1995) suggests that resulting renegotiation of the
listing contract may be Pareto-improving.
First consider the wealth maximization problem of the seller’s broker. After ﬁnding a
potential match for the seller, the broker must balance the incremental commission to be
received against the effort exerted to negotiate a higher transaction price and the
possibility that the buyer will walk away from the transaction. The relatively small share
of the increase in sales price that accrues to the broker is unlikely to provide the incentive
necessary to negotiate effectively for the highest price. In fact, when the buyer’s and
seller’s valuations are clearly very similar, the difference may not be sufﬁcient to justify
further negotiation and both the listing and the cooperating brokers may have incentive
to reveal information to the parties in an attempt to close the deal. Brokers have been
shown to respond to an incentive system that rewards only completed sales (Ball, 1991).
Numerical Example of Broker’s Incentive Conﬂict
Consider the same facts as the two-broker case with disclosed subagency, i.e.,
Ps5$95,000; PB5$105,000; a5.5; k5.06. Suppose that the parties have been
negotiating and the last bid by the buyer was $100,000. If the seller’s broker
knows the buyer’s reservation price, she knows that she might be able to get the
buyer to contract at a higher price. The incremental beneﬁt to achieving the
“split the surplus” transaction price of $103,092.78 is only 3% of the $3,092.78
difference or $92.78.
If the broker does not know the buyer’s reservation price, she still has some expectation
of that price and it is likely that the monetary incentive is not sufﬁcient to offset the risk
that the contract will fall through and a new buyer will have to be found. The incentive
incompatibility created by the prevalent form of broker compensation (percentage
commission) makes it likely that beneﬁts to sellers and buyers with brokers will be lower
than they would be without the agency costs. The problem may be less costly with the
entry of more buyer brokers in the business. In addition, reputation effects will partially
offset the incentive for brokers to reveal privileged information or to fail to strive to
obtain the best price for their principal.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study examines the differences in bargaining outcomes under several possible agency
arrangements and with different degrees of information asymmetry. Fully disclosed
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split of the surplus than those with undisclosed agency since, in the latter case,
information costs are born by the buyer. The existence of agency costs may also result in
reduced effort or breach of ﬁduciary duty by brokers on behalf of principals since the
incentive to close the sale will generally outweigh the incentive to obtain a higher price
(or lower price if they represent the buyer). With buyer brokers, the outcome to buyers
and sellers will depend on the method of compensation. With percentage commissions
and equal bargaining power, the seller shares the costs of the buyer broker commission,
even when the buyer’s separate commission exceeds the MLS share of the seller’s
commission.
In all the agency arrangements considered, the seller’s net proceeds are lower and the
buyer’s net costs are higher than in the no-agent case. However, the additional costs
borne by the principals are offset by beneﬁts associated with reduced search, better match
with trading partners, and transaction services provided by the brokers. If the value of the
brokers’ services are similar across agency alternatives, separate representation of each of
the principals will result in the lowest sales price and the highest total beneﬁt to the
principal, subject to the assumptions used in the analysis in this paper.
At this point there are only a few states that have passed legislation requiring full
disclosure of the agency relationship and encouraging the buyer broker or the facilitator
type of agency relationship. As this analysis shows, the costs and beneﬁts to the various
parties involved can be substantially different and it is important for brokers and
regulators of the real estate industry to understand the impact of their policies. If the
intent of the buyer brokerage arrangement is to reduce costs to the buyer, this study
shows that this outcome does not always occur. Further work in alternative buyer broker
compensation schemes is necessary to determine which arrangement is likely to be best
for both parties in the transaction. For example, an incentive-compatible contract could
be designed that rewards the agent for successfully lowering the sales price.
Notes
1An FTC study in 1983 found that 74% of home buyers believed the cooperating broker to be their
representative. A 1984 study by the Hawaii Real Estate Commission reported the number at 90%
for their sample.
2However, states are now moving toward making subagency optional for Multiple Listing Service
agreements and removing barriers to alternative forms of agency. For a summary of recent caselaw,
see Waller and Waller (1989).
3See Black (1992) and Ferguson (1992) for further discussion of the buyer broker relationship.
4For example, in the FTC study (1983), 62% of the buyers surveyed indicated that they had been
told by the cooperating broker how low a price the sellers would be likely to accept. The study also
found evidence that brokers revealed information obtained from the buyers, although such
revelation of information might be considered to be consistent with their ﬁduciary obligation to the
principal.
5The FTC reported (1983) that 66% of all residential real estate sales involved a cooperating broker.
6For example, Colorado recently passed speciﬁc legislation deﬁning the rights and duties of various
types of brokerage relationships, and buyers must sign a disclosure form indicating they understand
the agency relationship they have with the broker. Larsen (1994) provides a table (p. 214)
summarizing state-by-state agency disclosure rules as of 1987.
7For example, see Arnold (1992), Geltner et al. (1991), and Yavas ¸ (1992). Also see Yavas ¸ (1994) for
a thorough review of the literature on the economics of brokerage.
ADVERSARIAL BROKERAGE IN RESIDENTIAL TRANSACTIONS 738The assumption of expected value maximizing buyers, sellers and brokers is common in the real
estate literature.
9For the purpose of clarifying the presentation, the seller and the seller’s agent will be portrayed as
female and the buyer and the buyer’s agent as male.
10Reservation prices are assumed to be determined based upon all available information and
constraints on the parties. Thus, for example, a buyer’s reservation price will reﬂect available
downpayment, ability to qualify for a mortgage, the relative supply of available housing in the area,
and expectations with regard to the seller’s reservation price. The seller’s reservation price will
reﬂect the market conditions, mortgage payoff, etc.
11Since the exclusive right-to-sell contract is clearly preferable to agents, it is generally more
common. In contrast, an exclusive agency contract would require no payment of commission if the
seller were to locate the buyer herself. It is also possible that a seller might have incentive to exert
effort in ﬁnding a buyer if it will result in a better match, but the gains in sale price would have to
be offset by the costs to the seller.
12However, other researchers have found no price impact or indeterminate price impact resulting
from the use of brokers. See Frew and Jud (1987), Jud (1983) and Kamath and Yantek (1982).
13Evidence indicates that although, in practice, v is generally bounded away from both 0 and 1, it
is also not generally a 50–50 split. This may be an indication that the parties do not have equivalent
information or equal bargaining power (Frew and Jud, 1987).
14Commission levels for residential real estate are generally from 5%–7% of the sales price and are
typically split 50/50 between the listing and cooperating brokers. However, commission splits are
often established by the local Board of Realtors and therefore vary (Miceli, 1991). In addition,
commissions within a real estate ofﬁce may be split in different ways between the selling agent and
the owner (broker) of the agency. It is fairly common for high-volume agents to negotiate a higher
split with the broker.
15Note that even if the buyer does not directly reveal PB, the broker may be able to ascertain its level
by the acquisition of mortgage information and conversations with the buyer about the property in
question. Since prequaliﬁcation is a standard practice in the industry, the broker will have a very
good estimate of the maximum price the buyer can afford, although the price he is willing to pay
may be lower.
16Traditionally, an agreement to act only on behalf of the buyer violated most Multiple Listing
Service contracts (which automatically created a subagency relationship). However, agency conﬂicts
and potential for abuse inherent in the strict subagency contract has led to changes in this area.
17For example, in Colorado, a broker who only signs exclusive representation contracts with buyers
typically negotiates a commission of 3.5% of the transaction price. The seller’s broker receives one
half of the total commission (usually 6%) speciﬁed in the listing contract but the buyer must pay an
additional 0.5% of the price for his broker’s services.
18This is an example of the current trend toward “facilitator” brokers who charge a ﬁxed price or a
fee for services rendered. For example, the broker might charge $2,000 for her role in the
negotiations, mortgage processing, preparation of documents, and closing.
19Although the seller normally assumes that she will pay the entire commission, it will be in the best
interest of the buyer to reveal the separate representation. Therefore the seller will bargain under
the assumption that she will only have to pay a% of the k% commission.
20See Yavas ¸ and Colwell (1994) for a review of incentive-compatible contracts.
21In the agency literature, an incentive-compatible contract is one in which the effort level that
produces the best outcome to the agent also produces the best outcome to the principal. See, e.g.,
Rasmussen (1989).
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